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Abstract 
By exploiting a unique and proprietary panel dataset comprising 18,682 Italian SMEs operating 
with 99 cooperative banks over the period 2008-2014, we investigate the influence of the trade 
credit channel on firm investment decisions in the Italian market, distinguished by a considerable 
presence of relationship cooperative banks’ branches with a heterogeneous geographical 
distribution. Firstly, our findings confirm a significant influence of the trade credit channel on 
firm investment decisions. Secondly, we document that those SMEs located in those Italian 
provinces with an abundance of cooperative banks’ branches rely less on trade credit to finance 
investments. Lastly, we show that longer firm-bank relationships decrease firm dependence on 
trade credit to boost investments. Our study is of particular relevance because it strengthens the 
effectiveness of the commercial credit channel for SMEs in spurring corporate investments. 
Indeed, fostering a deep understanding of the real effects of firm financing sources is paramount 
to encourage investment by SMEs and to allow them to preserve their positioning in the market. 
Moreover, we exploit the Italian market, well-suited to perform such an analysis, since it is 
characterized by more inter-personal financing relationships as compared to other countries. 
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In a perfect capital market, trade credit investment and financing decisions are independent 
because companies enjoy an unlimited access to a wide array of sources of finance in a scenario 
in which asymmetric information is absent (Modigliani and Miller, 1958): companies are always 
capable to obtain external finance without problems at a reasonable price. However, in a more 
realistic imperfect capital market, companies may face an opportunity cost associated with trade 
credit due to the potential difficulty experienced by a firm to access credit through different 
sources of financing, such as bank credit. This is particularly relevant for small and midsize 
enterprises (SMEs) for which this opportunity cost is likely to be higher due to their 
informational opaqueness. Indeed, SMEs have borrowing issues related to information 
asymmetries and mostly rely upon commercial trade and relationship lending based on soft 
information. This feature not only makes trade credit the only other viable external source to 
bank credit during their life cycle (Canto-Cuevas et al., 2019), but also raises the likelihood that 
SMEs will get bank credit-constrained due to greater perceived risk. In this scenario, credit-
constrained SME are oriented to turn to trade credit which is the most important alternative to 
bank lending as a source of external financing (Carbo’-Valverde et al., 2016) in nearly every 
economy (Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2002)1. In contrast, larger firms are less likely to fall 
credit-constrained as they tend to borrow from large financial institutions that mostly rely on 
hard information in their lending decisions (Filomeni et al., 2020a, 2020b; Stein, 2002; Berger 
and Udell, 2006). In this regard, Berger and Udell (2006) show that large institutions tend to lend 
to larger firms, while small institutions lend more to smaller firms based on stronger bank-firm 
relationships (Haynes et al., 1999; Cole et al., 2004; Scott, 2004; Berger et al., 2005b). 
Within this context, this paper provides a novel contribution to the literature by 
investigating the extent to which SME reliance on the trade credit channel to finance investment 
decisions is affected by the structure of the local banking system and relationship banking 
features. To address our research objectives, on the one hand, we focus on SMEs because SMEs 
represent the backbone of the Italian economy and typically have fewer options to access capital 
markets as they are less transparent than their larger corporate counterparts and poses a higher 
credit risk (Petersen and Rajan 1997; Carey et al., 1993; Berger and Udell, 1998). Trade credit 
plays an important role in SME financing decisions (Hernandez-Canovas and Martınez-Solano, 
2007; Ogawa et al., 2013; Martınez-Sola et al., 2014) and it is the only major source of financing 
                                                             
1 In the US trade credit provides as much external finance as bank loans representing approximately one third of the 
debt of US SMEs (Berger and Udell, 2006). In the sample used by McGuinness et al. (2018), the more than two 
hundred thousand companies, located in 13 European countries, are net suppliers of 62 billion euros of trade credit, 
equal to 14% of total assets. 
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(Berger and Udell, 1998)2. On the other hand, Italy is characterized by geographical heterogeneity 
in the local banking system across the country: several provinces have an abundance of 
cooperative banks (Alessandrini and Zazzaro, 1999; Alessandrini et al., 2009), mostly relying on 
soft information in their credit relationships. Indeed, this allows us to exploit within-country 
geographical variation in the degree of inter-personal financing relationship characterizing the 
local banking system. At the same time, Italy provides an ideal setting for our study as SMEs 
represent a large segment of the corporate market (Bonaccorsi di Patti and Gobbi, 2001; Guiso 
et al., 2004; Benfratello et al., 2008; Alessandrini et al., 2009; La Rocca et al., 2010). Therefore, 
the Italian capital system, characterized by more inter-personal financing relationships compared 
to other countries, is well-suited to perform our analysis.  
In order to address our aforementioned research objectives, firstly, we investigate the real 
effects of the trade credit channel on long-term investments (Carbò-Valverde et al., 2016; 
Ferrando and Wolski, 2018). We do so by using a panel dataset comprising 18,682 SMEs 
operating in Italy in the time period 2008-2014. Following Love et al. (2007), Goncalves et al. 
(2018), and D’Mello and Toscano (2020), we measure trade credit as the net effect of extended 
and received trade credit, i.e., net trade credit3. Secondly, we specifically explore whether the 
local banking system affects the relationship between trade credit and SME investment decisions. 
We do this by exploiting within-country variation in the different degrees of inter-personal 
financing relationship of the local banking system, characterized by a heterogeneous geographical 
distribution of relationship cooperative banks’ branches. Thirdly, the granularity of the data at 
our disposal allows for the collection of information not only on firm accounting data, but also 
on specific firm-bank relationship features. In this regard, we study the differential effects of 
trade credit on firm investments by accounting for firm-bank relationship heterogeneity based on 
the length of the credit relationship and on the bank-borrower distance. Indeed, longer and 
closer firm-bank relationships lead to an increased collection of proprietary “soft” information 
on the part of the bank following repeated interactions with the same firm over time (Petersen 
and Rajan, 1994; Berger and Udell, 1995; Uchida et al., 2012; Bolton et al., 2016; Beck et al., 
2018). Overall, we believe addressing these questions is of crucial importance for policy makers 
in order to draw appropriate conclusions on the real effects of the trade credit channel as a 
                                                             
2
 For Italian firms, trade credit is a very important source of finance (e.g., Agostino and Trivieri 2014): during 2003–
2009, accounts payable constituted, on average, 19.6 % of total assets, while accounts receivable constituted 29.2 % 
(source: Bank for the Accounts of Companies Harmonised, available at http://www.bachesd.banque-france.fr.). 
3
 This allows us to take into account the fact that firms manage trade receivables and trade payables concurrently to 
optimise performance (Ferrando and Mulier, 2013) and manage risk (Fabbri and Klapper, 2008) since these two 
components of trade credit exert influence on each other (Niskanen and Niskanen, 2000). That is, firms are both 
trade creditors and trade debtors at the same time (Burkart and Ellingsen, 2004) and, thus, simultaneously manage 
receivables and payables (Hill et al., 2010). 
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financing source alternative to bank lending, and on whether the magnitude of the trade credit 
effect differs according to specific features of the bank-firm relationship and the local banking 
system. To the best of our knowledge, this study represents the first attempt to investigate the 
real effects of the trade channel for SMEs’ investment decisions by exploiting variation in inter-
personal financing relationships characterizing the different geographies of the Italian banking 
market. Moreover, the specificity of the sample, which refers to small businesses financed by 
local banks, allows us to investigate the phenomenon at a much higher level of detail than it is 
typically found in the literature.  
By way of preview, firstly we find a significant influence of the trade credit channel on 
firm investment decisions, suggesting that net trade credit significantly affects the growth rate of 
firm investment. Indeed, an increase in net trade credit triggers a decrease in the year-on-year 
percentage change of firm investments. This negative effect can be attributed to the liquidity-
absorbing consequence of an increase in net trade credit. Secondly, we document that those 
SMEs located in Italian geographical areas characterized by an abundance of cooperative banks’ 
branches, relying on soft information-intensive relationship banking, rely less on trade credit to 
finance their investment decisions. This is supportive of Berger et al. (2005b)’s view that local 
cooperative banks still benefit from a competitive advantage over nationwide banks in small 
business lending, since the latter are characterized by organizational complexity and face more 
severe communication frictions due to the greater distance between their headquarters and local 
branches. Lastly, we provide evidence that shorter firm-bank relationships lead to a greater 
dependence of companies on the trade credit channel to boost investments, while firm-bank 
geographical proximity does not exert a significant influence on this nexus due to the nature of 
our sample of cooperative banks operating with SMEs mostly on a local basis. 
Within the related literature, our paper is closely related to Carbò-Valverde et al. (2016), 
hereafter referred to as C-V, who analyze for the first time whether commercial credit provided 
an alternative source of external financing for SMEs’ investments during the 2008 crisis by using 
financial and banking data of nearly 40,000 businesses in Spain over the period 1994-2010. 
Similarly to C-V’s work, our paper assesses whether bank credit-constrained SMEs turned to 
trade credit as an alternative source of external financing to boost investments using information 
on firm characteristics and bank-firm lending relationships. However, our paper differs from C-
V’s study by adding new dimensions to the analysis related to relationship banking: it exploits 
within-country variation in inter-personal financing relationships characterizing the different 
geographies of the Italian banking market. 
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Our paper is also close to Ferrando and Wolski (2018) who investigate the relationship 
between net trade credit and firms’ investment levels by focusing on financially distressed firms. 
They provide evidence that, while net trade credit has an overall negative impact on investment 
level due to its liquidity-absorbing effect, this effect is less pronounced for more financially 
distressed firms since, through capital expenditure, the latter aim at maintaining crucial business 
relations with their customers in order to participate in the final profits via trade credit 
repayments. However, even if our results are supportive of the notion that a firm positive net 
trade credit position is liquidity-absorbing as it reduces the firm growth rate of investments, our 
paper extends the analysis by contemplating the relevance of the specific features of the bank-
firm relationship within the context of trade credit. Moreover, we observe the exact firm-bank 
relationship not just relying on a “matching procedure based on a fuzzy-matching algorithm 
subject to potential biases stemming from spurious firm-bank relations” (Ferrando and Wolski, 
2018).  
Moreover, we add a relationship banking dimension (Giannetti et al., 2011) and focus on 
bank credit constrained SMEs mostly relying on the trade credit channel for their investment 
choices (Carbò-Valverde et al., 2016). Unlike the focus of Giannetti et al. (2011) on commercial 
credit and on aspects of bank-firm relationships in the United States, the Italian dimension of 
our analysis allows us to investigate the impact of commercial credit on investment decisions in a 
more bank-oriented economic context.  
With the crisis generated by Covid-19, our study takes on even greater relevance. The 
shock that affected the economic world due to Covid-19 was strong. With countries accounting 
for more than 50% of world GDP frozen for at least two months, the decline in revenues has 
been more sustained than in previous recessions. The most vulnerable companies are those of 
smaller size that do not make use of securities markets and for which recourse to government 
funds is not always easy. Without considering the effects of government support interventions, 
there is a strong and ongoing concern that SMEs have been hardly hit by the pandemic. In this 
context, finding adequate solutions to help SME's is essential given that over two thirds (70%) of 
global employment is provided by small economic units (ILO, 2019). Understanding the effects 
of trade credit and its function of supporting investment activity in times of crisis can encourage 
academics, policy makers and operators to find the most appropriate solutions (e.g. supply chain 
credit) to support SMEs in absorbing the impact of the current crisis and continue investing 
even in uncertain scenarios.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the Italian 
banking system with a focus on its geographical heterogeneity, relationship banking, and 
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cooperative banks, Section 3 discusses the relevant literature, Section 4 describes our data, 
Section 5 presents our empirical methodology, Section 6 highlights the results of our empirical 
analysis, Section 7 reports on several robustness tests and, last, in Section 8, we conclude. 
 
2. The Italian banking system: cooperative banks, relationship banking and   
geographical heterogeneity 
Cooperative banks play an important role in the capital markets of many countries (McKillop et 
al., 2020)4. In Italy, today they are the most representative form of banking localism. Cooperative 
credit banks have a direct presence in more than a third of the Italian municipalities and, in 620 
municipalities (out of 7,903), they operate as a single intermediary (Bank of Italy, 2019). Their 
vocation to retail banking is evidenced by the fact that 59% of assets are destined for loans to 
households and small- and medium-sized businesses (6% more than other banks). Support for 
the territory is confirmed by the destination of the collected resources: for every 100 euros of 
savings collected in the area, 87 euros become credit to the real economy of that area.  
The small size and the orientation to the local market favour relationship lending and the 
reduction of information asymmetries between lenders and borrowers (Petersen and Rajan, 1994; 
Berger and Udell, 1995; Berger et al., 2004; Elsas, 2005; Beck et al., 2018). The information 
advantage enjoyed by cooperative banks over their larger counterparts, as well as their proximity 
to the entrepreneurial and social fabric of the territory, translate into a better capacity to select 
and monitor opaque borrowers such as SMEs (McKillop et al. 2020). The superior ability to 
collect and manage information relating to customers, especially soft information, has meant that 
the impact of the financial crisis on the availability of credit disbursed by cooperative banks was 
less severe than the one observed in different types of banks (Ferri et al., 2014). Indeed, in the 
last decade the cooperative banks introduced net loans by over €11 billion into the economic 
circuit with an increase of 9.1% higher than the overall growth in the credit market of +4.6% 
(Lopez et al., 2019). 
While Italy has been unified for the last 150 years, the local banking system varies notably 
across provinces. As a matter of fact, several provinces are characterized by an abundance of 
small cooperative banks that operate in restricted territorial areas (Alessandrini and Zazzaro, 
1999; Alessandrini et al., 2009). Local cooperative banks benefit from competitive advantages 
over nationwide banks, as the latter are afflicted by organizational complexity and more severe 
problems in communicating information (Berger et al., 2005b; Filomeni et al., 2020a). Indeed, 
                                                             
4
 Cooperative banks are a key component of the cooperative movement in the credit sector, which originated in 




the distance between the bank headquarters and local branches of nationwide banks gives rise to 
information frictions within the banking organization, because the bank headquarters are less 
able to interpret the information coming from distant branches than information from closer 
ones (Stein, 2002; Liberti and Petersen, 2019; Filomeni et al, 2020a; Filomeni et al, 2020b).  
On the one hand, while the lending decisions of large national banks tend to be based on 
hard information, small cooperative banks rely on soft information collected directly and 
indirectly through personal bank-firm relationships and continuous interaction with local firms 
(Howorth and Moro, 2006). On the other hand, suppliers provide credit to their customers 
because the soft information accumulated in repeated trading relationships provides them with a 
significant advantage over banks in granting credit (Biais and Gollier, 1997; Petersen and Rajan, 
1997). It follows that, if both firm trade credit decisions and local cooperative banks’ credit 
decisions rely on soft information, trade credit and cooperative bank loans could act as 
substitutes. Consistent with this view, a high proportion of cooperative bank branches in a 
province should reduce the need for trade credit and, as such, affect the relationship between 
trade credit and firm investment decisions. As a matter of fact, a local bank, whose employees 
are part of the local community, and that may be owned or managed by local community 
members, possesses a more direct and in-depth knowledge of firms located in its operating area. 
Indeed, the local bank participates to the local community life, thus collecting information not 
available to banks that operate at a distance (Angelini et al., 1998; Stein, 2002). Moreover, even if 
nationwide banks’ local branches may integrate borrowers’ hard information with valuable soft 
information collected locally, or if large complex banks use transaction lending technologies well-
suited to SMEs such as credit scoring (Berger and Udell, 2006; Ferri and Neuberger, 2014), 
community banks are still expected to benefit from an informational advantage in providing 
loans to local firms due to their engagement in relationship lending  (Bolton et al. 2016; Filomeni 
et al., 2020a; Filomeni et al., 2020b). Bartoli et al. (2013) note that transactional lending, even 
when using sophisticated technologies, does not substitute for relationship banking in the 
granting of soft-information intensive loans to SMEs. Presbitero and Zazzaro (2011) prove 
evidence that the organizational structure of local credit markets influences relationship lending. 
On the one hand, in markets where large, out-of-market banks predominate, increases in 
interbank competition are detrimental to relationship lending. On the other hand, in markets 
where a large group of small local banks operate, increased competitive pressure from outside 




3. Literature review and hypotheses development 
The relevance of trade credit as an important alternative source to bank finance has not gone 
unnoticed within the academic community, where several papers have analysed both the financial 
and economic aspects of trade credit (Pattnaik, 2020a) and the multi-disciplinary nature of inter-
firm credit transactions (Pattnaik, 2020b). In this regard, Pattnaik et al. (2020a) and Pattnaik et al. 
(2020b) provide a comprehensive and up-to-date overview of the trade credit literature. While 
the former focuses on the financial and economic aspects of this literature, the latter displays a 
multidisciplinary nature in line with the evolution and growth of related research. Paul and 
Boden (2008) recognize that the theoretical and empirical exposure of the commercial credit 
literature is diversified with contributions from multiple streams of studies in order to better 
investigate the numerous factors influencing the trade credit channel. 
From an industrial perspective, product natures (Giannetti et al., 2011), buyer-supplier 
relationships (McMillan and Woodruff, 1999), institutional establishment including the legal 
system and level of political links (Barrot, 2015) influence, among others, trade credit demand 
and supply. Simultaneously, trade credit channel is guided by the financial infrastructure of an 
economy (Fisman and Love, 2003; Miwa and Ramseyer, 2008; Degryse et al., 2018), economic 
policy uncertainty (D’Mello and Toscano, 2020; Jory et al., 2020), financial market development 
(Ge and Qiu, 2007; Abdulla et al., 2017), company financials (Andrieu et al., 2018; García-Teruel 
and Martínez-Solano, 2010b; Dary and James, 2019), financing constraints and macro-economic 
drivers (Bastos and Pindado, 2013; Jinjarak, 2015; Carbó-Valverde et al., 2016). Beside the 
quantitative perspectives, qualitative research shows that both cultural (El Ghoul and Zheng, 
2016; Bedendo et al., 2020) and social factors (Wu et al., 2014; Levine et al., 2018) influence the 
demand and supply of trade credit. Within an increasingly complex global market, trade credit 
channel plays a critical role in driving business growth (Chowdhury and Lang, 1996; Fisman and 
Love, 2003) and affects inventory policy (Haley and Higgins, 1973; Chung et al., 2005), 
competitive advantage (Pirttilä et al., 2019), and firm performance (Allen et al., 2019).  
For financial theory, trade credit is a financing agreement between non-financial 
corporations extended to meet the business objectives of firms with or without banking 
intermediation (Schwartz, 1974; Mian and Smith, 1992; García-Teruel and Martínez-Solano, 
2010b). The agreement has a double advantage: the buyer has a financial benefit as it extends the 
payment deadline; those who sell have a commercial advantage because, thanks to the extension 
of the terms of collection, they can benefit from an increase in sales. Acknowledging trade credit 
as a significant source of finance to small and medium enterprises (SMEs), Petersen and Rajan 
(1997) empirically validate the financing and marketing theories of trade credit and provide some 
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of the methodologies widely followed in later empirical investigations (García-Teruel and 
Martínez-Solano, 2010a; Afrifa and Gyapong, 2017). The financing hypothesis dominates in 
rationalizing the empirical results given that the point at which commercial credit replaces bank 
credit as an alternative source of financing is among those most frequently dealt with (Bastos and 
Pindado, 2013; Carbò-Valverde et al., 2016; Norden et al., 2020). 
Among the different dimensions of trade credit research, we aim at addressing the 
following research questions summarized in the hypotheses described in the next sections, with 
the objective to broaden the vision of the work on the financial perspective of the trade credit 
channel:  
 Is there a significant relationship between trade credit and SME investment decisions? 
 If so, does this relationship vary in provinces with an abundance of relationship cooperative 
banks’ branches? 
 If so, is their relationship affected by firm-bank relationship features? 
 
3.1 Trade credit channel and firm investment decisions 
The empirical evidence on the influence of the trade credit channel on firm investment decisions 
is still mixed. While Coricelli and Frigerio (2016) find that the provision of trade credit may drain 
the investment-supportive liquidity, Dass et al. (2015) provide theoretical and empirical evidence 
that the provision of trade credit can act as a commitment device for making relationship-
specific investments5. Consistent with Coricelli and Frigerio (2016), Ferrando and Wolski (2018) 
study the relationship between net trade credit and firms’ investment levels by focusing on both 
financially distressed firms and crisis periods by using a large panel of more than 10 million firms 
in 23 EU countries over the period 2004–2014. Their results suggest that net trade credit has an 
overall negative impact on firm investment due to its liquidity-absorbing nature. Moreover, 
Carbò-Valverde et al. (2016) examine whether trade credit provided an alternative source of 
external finance to SMEs during the crisis. Using firm-level Spanish data they document that 
credit-constrained SMEs depend on trade credit, but not bank loans, and that the intensity of 
this dependence increased during the financial crisis. 
 
 
                                                             
5
 In an environment with incomplete contracts and bargaining power, Dass et al. (2015) argue that trade credit poses 
itself as a quality guarantee mechanism to mitigate the uncertainty of the downstream company on the quality of 
acquired goods. This quality can be enhanced by extra investment efforts of the upstream company. Therefore, their 
empirical investigation confirms this theoretical prediction by suggesting that trade credit, in the form of accounts 
receivables, is positively associated with relationship-specific investments. 
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Our above discussion on the effects of the trade credit channel on firm investment can be 
summarized in our first hypothesis (H1): 
 
H1. The trade credit channel significantly affects corporate investment and, as such, brings over real effects in the 
economy. 
 
3.2 Trade credit channel and the local banking system  
As described in Section 2, the structure of the Italian local banking system is characterized by 
geographical heterogeneity. Its effect on the relationship between trade credit and firm 
investment is not clear a priori. On the one hand, a greater proportion of local relationship 
cooperative banks’ branches in Italian provinces should facilitate access to bank loans and 
reduces finance constraints for SMEs with which they have established relationships in the 
operating area (Alessandrini et al., 2009; La Rocca et al., 2010). This leads us to expect that 
facilitated access to bank credit should weaken firm reliance on the trade credit channel to 
finance investments, if the given firm is located in a province with a high proportion of 
relationship cooperative banks’ branches. Indeed, local cooperative banks benefit from a 
competitive advantage over nationwide banks in small business lending, since the latter are 
characterized by organizational complexity and face more severe communication frictions due to 
the greater distance between their headquarters and local branches (Berger et al., 2005b). On the 
other hand, a number of studies challenge this conventional paradigm according to which 
community banks (small, single-market, local institutions) form strong relationships with 
informationally opaque small businesses (Haynes et al., 1999; Cole et al., 2004; Scott, 2004; 
Berger et al., 2005b). These studies document that changes in lending technologies and 
deregulation of the banking industry has made it easier for large and nonlocal banks to serve 
small, opaque firms (Berger et al., 2014). Berger and Udell (2006) highlight that large banks are 
also capable of serving small and opaque firms well using hard-information technologies, i.e., 
credit scoring and lending against fixed asset collateral, consistent with Frame et al. (2001) and 
Berger et al. (2005a). de la Torre et al. (2010) find that both large and small banks cater to small 
firms with an increasing use of hard information-based technologies (Berger and Black, 2011; 
Berger et al. 2011). Both Frame et al. (2004) and DeYoung et al. (2011) document that small 
business credit scoring is accountable for an increase in lending distance. 
Our second hypothesis (H2) summarizes the influence of the structure of the local 




H2. The effect of the trade credit channel on firm investments is affected by the proportion of local cooperative 
banks’ branches relying on soft information-intensive relationship banking, 
 
3.3 Trade credit channel and relationship banking  
Studies investigating the nexus between trade credit and relationship banking are limited. In this 
regard, a valuable contribution is provided by Giannetti et al. (2011) who document that “trade 
credit usage is correlated with the buyer’s banking relationships”, by focusing on the United 
States. Specifically, they show that firms receiving trade credit secure financing from relatively 
uninformed banks, thus supporting our findings that the proprietary soft information collected 
by the bank decreases the likelihood of the borrowing firm being credit-constrained (Berger and 
Udell, 2002; Gobbi and Sette, 2014; Presbitero et al., 2014; Bolton et al., 2016). Moreover, 
Giannetti et al. (2011) find that firms that make greater use of the trade credit channel have 
shorter relationships with their banks. In a similar vein, Von Thadden (1995) and Degryse and 
Ongena (2004) provide evidence that firms borrowing from distant banks for short periods are 
generally considered to have arm’s length relations with their lenders who gather only limited, 
and mostly hard, information about their borrowing corporates. Furthermore, McMillan and 
Woodruff (1999), Johnson et al. (2002), and Uchida et al. (2007) document that longer duration 
of trading relationships is often associated with a greater use of the trade credit channel.  
Our third hypothesis (H3) summarizes the influence of the trade credit channel on firm 
investment decisions according to relationship banking-related features: 
 
H3. The effect of the trade credit channel on firm investments is decreasing in the length of the firm-bank 
relationships, while is unaffected by the bank-firm distance as cooperative banks operate with SMEs mostly on a 
local basis.  
 
4. Data  
This paper exploits the granularity and the uniqueness of a proprietary dataset combining public 
firm and bank-level financial information with private bank-firm lending information on a 
sample of 18,682 Italian SMEs operating with 99 cooperative banks over the time period 2008-
2014.  
Public financial information concerns the economic and financial characteristics of the 
companies and banks in our sample. The firm-level variables concern the composition of assets 
and liabilities, the intensity of the investment activity, the economic performance measured by 
the return on assets (ROA). The bank-level characteristics concern the profitability (i.e. return on 
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average asset - ROAA), capitalization (i.e., bank's equity ratio) and the quality of the loans 
disbursed (impaied loans over total loans) of the cooperative banks in our sample. Cooperative 
banks, which cover about 7.2% of the Italian loan market (McKillop et. al., 2020), are known to 
be close to the territory and attentive to the needs of smaller companies (Baccarani et al., 2013), 
such as the SMEs populating our dataset. We collect data on firm accounting variables from 
Centrale dei Bilanci (CEBI) and on bank variables from Bankscope6. 
Private lending information is of two types. On the one hand, we observe the duration of 
the relationship between the company and the bank and the distance between the borrower and 
the bank. The data were provided exclusively to us by CSD, an Italian company that manages the 
information system of more than 100 Italian cooperative banks. On the other hand, they include 
data on a borrower’s debt position towards the banking system that are collected from the Italian 
Credit Register (CR) managed by the Bank of Italy.  
Our setting involves the presence of 99 cooperative banks located in 100 Italian 
provinces spread over the Italian territory and lending to 83 different industries according to the 
2-digit Ateco industry classification7. In particular, firms in our sample belong to the following 
six macro-industries: agriculture, commerce, transports and hotels, manufacturing, building and 
services. We exclude public administration and financial firms. Companies are segmented on the 
basis of two main criteria: synthetic codes of economic activity, i.e., 2-digit Ateco industry 
classification, and their legal form. The Ateco code allows each company to be correctly 
associated with a specific sector, while the fact that all the companies in the sample belong to the 
capital companies segment makes it possible to have a homogeneous set of accounting data 
drawn from their annual financial statements.  
Lastly, data on the number of cooperative banks’ branches located in Italian provinces 
are collected from the Bank of Italy. 
Table 1 reports the definition of the dependent and explanatory variables used in the 
analysis and some descriptive statistics. 
 




                                                             
6
 For SMEs, trade credit forms a substantial part of their balance sheet, i.e., in our sample, on average, firms engage 
in providing and receiving trade credit at the levels of 39.3% and 28.9% respectively, as a share of their total assets. 
7
 Out of these 100 Italian provinces, 43 are located in Northern Italy, 21 in Central Italy, and 36 in Southern Italy 
and on the islands. 
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5. Empirical methodology 
The empirical approach relies on panel data estimation on a sample of 18,682 Italian SMEs in 
the time period ranging from 2008 to 2014. Our panel data structure allows us to control for 
time invariant and unobserved factors specific to each firm-bank pair driving differences in firm 
investment decisions. All the estimated models are saturated by time and industry-specific fixed 
effects, or by a vector of industry-year fixed effects with industries characterized at the 2-digit 
level of the Ateco 2007 classification of economic activities8. 
In model selection, we performed the Hausman test to determine whether to implement 
a fixed- or random-effects model. This test leads us to reject the null hypothesis of random 
effects, thereby accepting the implementation of a fixed-effect (FE) model. To mitigate the issue 
of the heteroskedasticity of residuals, detected by performing the modified Wald test for 
groupwise heteroskedasticity in FE regression models, we test all our models using 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. To avoid the effect of outliers driving our results, data 
are winsorized at the 5% level9. 
 
5.1 Trade credit channel and firm investment decisions 
Firstly, we test whether the trade credit channel affects firm investment. Following Kaplan and 
Zingales (1997), Fazzari et al. (2000), and Carbo’-Valverde et al. (2016), firm investment is 
introduced as the ratio of the year-on-year change in capital expenditure relative to the total 
amount of capital in the previous year, where capital expenditure is computed as the annual 
change in fixed assets, i.e., inclusive of financial, intangible and tangible fixed assets, plus 
amortization and depreciation ∆ 𝑋 .  
Following Afrifa and Gyapong (2016), the trade credit channel is introduced as the 
difference between the firm’s account receivables and account payables scaled by the firm’s size 
as measured by total assets, i.e., net trade credit, NTC 10. Specifically, the net trade credit position 
                                                             
8
 This classification is the national version of the European nomenclature, Nace Rev. 2, published in the Official 
Journal of 20 December 2006 (Regulation (EC) no 1893/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 
December 2006). 
9
 Given that it is often not encouraged to reject outliers, especially when there is no tangible explanation about the 
occurrence of outliers as in the context of our paper, one remedy suggested by the related literature is to lower the 
impact of the outlying observations by implementing winsorization (Dixon & Tukey, 1969; Dixon & Yuen, 1974), a 
popular accommodation method to reduce the weights of outliers by replacing them with a specific percentile of 
data-dependent values (Dixon & Yuen, 1974; Orr et al., 1991). The percentile of winsorization is suggested to be 
adjusted according to the shape of the distribution (Dixon & Yuen, 1974; Tukey, 1962). Therefore, to minimize 
such influence, data are winsorized at the 5% level, i.e., 5% in each tail, following focused visual inspection of the 
distribution of our sample values in order to minimize the disproportionate influence of outliers on statistical 
analyses that might lead to distortions of statistical significance tests. 
10
 In unreported regressions, available upon request, we test the robustness of our results by scaling the difference 




measures the cash tied up in the trade cycle before it comes back out as cash again. The longer 
the net trade credit position of a given firm, the greater is its working capital requirement 
(Bernstein and Wild, 1998). On the one hand, a positive net trade credit position requires the 
company to finance the days taken by account receivables to be cashed in by tapping its 
financing sources. On the other hand, a negative net trade credit position reflects a situation in 
which the given firm is being paid for its sales before having to pay its account payables. 
Following Petersen and Rajan (1997), when we view the firm as a supplier, “its accounts 
receivable are a proxy for how much it lends its customers”, while when we view the firm as a 
customer, “its accounts payable are its borrowing from its supplier”. In this perspective, we 
construct a measure of the firm net trade credit position by examining commercial relationships 
cultivated by a firm in the role of both customer (borrower) and supplier (lender) according to 
the above definitions. Net trade credit is taken at time  rather than  − 1 to mimic the short-
term nature of trade credit contracts, usually less than one year (Ferrando and Wolski, 2018). 
However, we recognize that it can be potentially susceptible to reverse causality bias and 
therefore we run instrumental variable estimation as a robustness test to address this issue as 
described in section 6.1. 
Our fixed effects (FE) panel data baseline regression model for the trade credit channel 
and firm investment decisions takes the following form: 
  ∆ 𝑋 ,𝑛, =  + ,𝑛, + ∑ 𝑋 ,𝑛, += 𝜑 , + 𝑛 𝑦𝑛 + 𝑦 𝑎 + 𝜇 𝑛 𝑦𝑛 ∗ 𝑦 𝑎 +  ,𝑛,        
(1) 
 
where 𝑋 ,𝑛,  is the vector of control variables representing firm-specific characteristics for 
firm i, operating in industry n in year t described in section 4.5; 𝑛 𝑦𝑛 are industry dummies 
to control for industry-specific effects according to the 2-digit Ateco industry classification; 𝑦 𝑎  are yearly time dummies to control for time-specific effects; and ,  is the error term for 
firm i in year t; 𝑛 𝑦𝑛 ∗ 𝑦 𝑎  are industry-year fixed effects in order to control for all 
time-varying shocks at the industry level. Moreover, the nature of the panel dataset with fixed 
effects (𝜑 , ) allows us to control for firm i-bank k pair-specific unobserved heterogeneity. 
A description of the construction of the model variables, as well as their descriptive 





5.2 Trade credit channel and the local banking system  
Secondly, we explore whether the structure of the local banking system affects the relationship 
between trade credit and SME investment decisions. That is, we explore whether a high 
proportion of cooperative banks’ branches in a province should reduce the need for trade credit 
and, as such, moderate the relationship between trade credit and firm investment decisions. To 
this purpose, we interact our measure of net trade credit, i.e., NTC, with the variable cooperative 
banking, a binary variable equal to 1 if the density of cooperative banks’ branches with respect to 
the number of firms operating in a given Italian province is above the median value of the 
distribution and 0 otherwise11. 
Our FE panel data regression model for the trade credit channel and the local banking 
system takes the following form: 
 ∆ 𝑋 ,𝑛, =  + ,𝑛, + ,𝑛, ∗ 𝑖𝑣  𝑖 𝑔 + 𝑖𝑣  𝑖 𝑔 +                             ∑ 𝑋 ,𝑛, += 𝜑 , + 𝑛 𝑦𝑛 + 𝑦 𝑎 + 𝜇 𝑛 𝑦𝑛 ∗ 𝑦 𝑎 +  ,𝑛,                    (2) 
 
where 𝑋 ,𝑛,  is the vector of control variables representing firm-specific characteristics for 
firm i, operating in industry n in year t described in section 4.5. 
By investigating the sign and the statistical significance of the coefficient β  in Eq. (2) we 
can make inferences on whether the structure of the local banking system affects firm reliance 
on the trade credit channel to spur investments. On the one hand, a positive and statistically 
significant coefficient  would document that a high proportion of relationship cooperative 
banks’ branches should facilitate small business access to bank credit and, as such, weaken firm 
reliance on the trade credit channel to spur investments. On the other hand, a non-statistically 
significant coefficient  would signal that changes in lending technologies and deregulation of 
the banking industry have made it easier for large and nonlocal banks to serve small, opaque 
firms, thus eroding the comparative advantage of local soft information-intensive relationship 
banks in serving small businesses. 
 
                                                             
11
 In unreported regressions, available upon request, we adopt an alternative cutoff point to construct cooperative 
banking according to which we set the latter equal to 1 if the density of cooperative banks’ branches with respect to 
the number of firms operating in a given Italian province is above the 75th percentile of the distribution and 0 
otherwise. Our main results remain unchanged. 
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5.3 Trade credit channel and relationship banking 
Thirdly, we investigate whether the influence of the trade credit channel on firm investment 
decisions is moderated by firm-bank relationship features12. Specifically, we are interested in 
investigating whether the specific characteristics of a given firm-bank financing relationship leads 
to a differential impact of the trade credit channel on firm investments. To this purpose, we 
construct the binary variable relationship banking that is proxied by either the length of the bank-
firm relationship (length of relationship) or the geographical distance between the borrowing firm 
and the lending branch (borrower-to-branch distance). 
Our FE panel data regression model for the trade credit channel and relationship 
banking takes the following form: 
 ∆ 𝑋 ,𝑛, =  + ,𝑛, + ,𝑛, ∗ 𝑖 ℎ𝑖  𝑖 𝑔 + 𝑖 ℎ𝑖  𝑖 𝑔 +                             ∑ 𝑋 ,𝑛, += 𝜑 , + 𝑛 𝑦𝑛 + 𝑦 𝑎 + 𝜇 𝑛 𝑦𝑛 ∗ 𝑦 𝑎 +  ,𝑛,                    (3) 
 
where 𝑋 ,𝑛,  is the vector of control variables representing firm-specific characteristics for 
firm i, operating in industry n in year t described in section 4.5. 
Therefore, at the firm-bank relationship level, we observe the length of the bank-firm 
relationship and the bank-borrower distance (Agarwal, 2010; Agarwal and Hauswald, 2010; 
Alessandrini et al., 2009; Carbo’-Valverde et al., 2016; Filomeni et al. 2020a; Filomeni et al. 
2020b)13. The motivation lays in the fact that, a priori, firm characterized by deeper banking 
relationships might decrease their reliance on the trade credit channel as a funding source in a 
context where relationship banking provides benefits for both the lender and the borrower in 
terms of a Pareto-improving exchange of information between the parties involved and several 
welfare-improving contractual features.  
                                                             
12
 In the study of Berger and Udell (2002), relationship banking is defined as a lending technology which is 
alternative to transaction banking based exclusively on hard information; in this respect, they affirm that: “the 
information gathered over time has significant value beyond the firm’s financial statements, collateral, and credit score, helping the 
relationship lender deal with informational opacity problems better than potential transaction lenders”. Relationship banking is 
based on soft information. In this respect, the figure of the loan officer is of crucial importance in collecting soft 
information since the loan officer not only establishes the firm-bank relationship in the first place, but also conducts 
due diligence during loan underwriting and performs subsequent monitoring of the borrower after the loan is 
disbursed (Berger and Udell, 2006). 
13
 Agarwal (2010) and Agarwal and Hauswald (2010) make use of the binary variable repeated relationship in their 
empirical analysis, equal to 1 in there is a prior relationship, and 0 otherwise, as well as of the borrower-to-branch 
distance. Agarwal (2010) investigate the effect of physical firm-bank distance on the collection and use of subjective 
intelligence in informationally opaque credit markets. Agarwal and Hauswald (2010) examine how the allocation of 
authority inside the bank affects the production, transmission and strategic use of soft information in lending 
decisions. Agarwal (2010) show that greater bank-firm distance erodes the quality of local soft information, 
therefore reducing the reliance on soft information in credit decisions. Alessandrini et al. (2009) find that smaller 
operational distance does not always enhance credit availability. 
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Firstly, the length of the bank-firm relationship allows us to assess the nature and the 
strength of the bank-firm relationship, which facilitates the collection of borrower-specific 
information and is defined as a categorical variable length of relationship equal to number of years of 
the lending relationship. To test whether the influence of the trade credit channel on firm 
investment is negatively associated to the length of the bank-firm relationship, we interact NTC 
with length of relationship and investigate the sign and the significance of coefficient  in Eq. (3) 
associated with the interaction term. As anticipated, length of relationship allows us to capture the 
nature and the strength of the bank-firm relationship which might significantly affect the 
relationship between trade credit and firm investment behavior. 
Secondly, the bank-borrower distance is assessed by defining the binary variable 
borrower-to-branch distance equal to one if the borrower’s headquarters and the branch in 
which the loan officer in charge of developing the firm-bank relationship are located in the same 
geographical location, and zero otherwise. Since relationship lending is considered an appropriate 
tool for bank lending to more informationally opaque SMEs, and evidence suggests that it could 
alleviate credit constraints (Berger and Udell, 2002; Scott, 2006; Gobbi and Sette, 2014; 
Presbitero et al., 2014; Bolton et al., 2016), therefore it potentially mitigates firm reliance on the 
trade credit channel as a financing source. To test whether the influence of the trade credit 
channel on firm investment significantly differs according to the bank-borrower distance, we 
interact NTC with borrower-to-branch distance and investigate the sign and the significance of 
coefficient  in Eq. (3) associated with the interaction term. As anticipated, borrower-to-branch 
distance allows us to assess the ease of soft information transmission between the borrowing firm 
and the lending bank due to greater geographical proximity. 
 
5.4 Control variables 
In our regressions, we control for several firm-specific characteristics that could influence firm 
investment behaviour, other than the trade credit channel. 
At the firm level, we control for the firm current ratio 𝑅 ,𝑛, , measured as the ratio of 
current assets over current liabilities, in order to supervise the effect that the hedging of current 
assets may have on firm investment changes. We also control for the firm unit labor cost 𝐿 ,𝑛,  as labor costs may divert cash flows away from investment purposes, for the firm 
inventory period 𝐼 𝑣 ,𝑛,  as the longer the inventory is held, the more the warehouse 
drain financial resources and reduces the firm investment possibilities, for the firm inventory to 
assets ratio 𝐼 𝑣 /  ,𝑛,  which reflects the portion of assets tied up in 
inventory since the inventory changes are associated with the release of cash flows which 
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promote investments, and for the firm return on assets 𝑅 ,𝑛,  to take into account the 
influence of firm profitability on investment decisions. Finally, we include three different 
additional ratios to control for the size of the borrowing firm, i.e., the firm tangible assets to total 
assets ratio 𝑔𝑖  /  ,𝑛, , the firm intangible assets to total assets ratio 𝐼 𝑔𝑖  /  ,𝑛, , the firm financial fixed assets to total assets ratio 𝑖 𝑖  𝑖  /  ,𝑛, . 
At the firm-bank level, we control for the short term and long term bank debt scaled by 
total liabilities  /  𝐿𝑖 𝑖 𝑖 𝑖 , , , in line with Coluzzi et al. (2012) and Heshmati 
(2001), who show that access to bank loans is an important driver of firm growth and may, 
consequently, affect firm investment behavior. 
 
6. Results 
Firstly, we are interested in investigating the relationship between the trade credit channel and 
firm investment decisions. The former is measured by the firm net trade credit position in given 
year t (NTC). The latter, our dependent variable, is defined as the ratio of the year-on-year 
change in capital expenditure between the previous year t-1 and the current quarter t relative to 
the total amount of capital in the previous year t-1 (∆CAPEX). Table 2 shows the results from 
running our baseline model, which is empirically defined in equation (1). We are interested in 
investigating the statistical significance of the coefficient  associated with our main regressor 
(NTC) to analyse whether the trade credit channel significantly influences firm investment 
behavior. In this regard, columns (1) to (4) of Table 2 show that the NTC coefficient  is 
negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. We interpret this result to mean that an 
increase in the firm net trade credit position is reflected in a decrease in the growth rate of capital 
expenditure by our sample of SMEs, ceteris paribus. Confirmatory graphical evidence is 
provided by Figure 1 showing the predicted outcomes of ∆CAPEX at different percentiles of 
NTC: when moving from the 10th percentile (-19%), characterizing a firm receiving trade credit, 
to the 90th percentile of NTC distribution, reflecting a firm extending trade credit (46.8%), 
∆CAPEX decreases, on average, from 22.3% to -2%, respectively.14 
 
[Insert table 2 about here]  
 
                                                             
14
 The impact of explanatory variables on the growth rate of firm investment is computed using the “margins” 
command in Stata, keeping all the other variables at the average. 
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Secondly, we explore whether the structure of the local banking system affects the 
relationship between trade credit and SME investment decisions. We do this by exploiting 
within-country variation in the Italian local banking structure characterized by different degrees 
of inter-personal financing relationships. As described in Section 2, the Italian banking system is 
populated by a large number of cooperative banks that operate in restricted territorial areas, 
mostly located in the north part of the country (Alessandrini and Zazzaro, 1999; Alessandrini et 
al., 2009) and that benefit from competitive advantages over nationwide banks by more reliably 
processing soft information collected directly and indirectly through personal bank-firm 
relationships (Howorth and Moro, 2006). Indeed, nationwide banks are more afflicted by 
organizational complexity and communications frictions in hardening and transmitting soft 
information over greater distance between their headquarters and local branches (Berger et al., 
2005; Filomeni et al., 2020a). This prompts them to research economies of scale in the 
processing of hard information and to specialize in transactional lending (Ferri and Neuberger, 
2014). Model specification is shown by Equation (2). The estimation results are reported in 
columns (1)-(2) in Table 3. The sign and the statistical significance of the coefficient  on the 
interaction terms NTC*cooperative banking in both column (1) and (2) is positive and statistically 
significant, thus suggesting that a high proportion of relationship cooperative banks’ branches 
facilitates small business access to bank credit and, as such, weaken firm reliance on the trade 
credit channel to spur investments. This is supportive of the notion that local banks still benefit 
from a competitive advantage over nationwide banks in small business lending (Berger et al., 
2005b), despite changes in lending technologies and deregulation of the banking industry are 
challenging their advantage to serve small, opaque firms (Berger et al., 2014)15. 
 
[Insert table 3 about here]  
 
Thirdly, we investigate whether the influence of the trade credit channel on firm 
investment decisions differs according to relationship banking features. Model specification is 
shown by Equation (3). Table 4 shows the results of this analysis. 
First, to test whether the influence of the trade credit channel on firm investment 
significantly differs according to the length of the bank-firm relationship, we interact NTC  with 
length of relationship which is equal to number of years of the lending relationship. Model 
specification is shown by Equation (3). The estimation results of our model are reported in 
                                                             
15
 In unreported regressions, available upon request, we also control for the proportion of non-cooperative banks’ 
branches located in a given province with respect to the number of firms operating in that province to account for 
the structure of the local banking system. This leaves our main results unaffected.  
20 
 
column (1) of Table 4. The sign and the statistical significance of the coefficient  on the 
interaction term NTC*length of relationship is positive and statistically significant at the 1% and 5% 
level, as shown in columns (1) and (2) in Table 4, thus suggesting that longer bank-firm 
relationships are associated with a decreased influence of the trade credit channel on firm 
investment decisions. These results are supportive of the extant literature providing evidence that 
proprietary “soft” information, i.e., relationship banking, decreases the likelihood of the 
borrowing firm being credit-constrained (Berger and Udell, 2002; Scott, 2006; Gobbi and Sette, 
2014; Presbitero et al., 2014; Bolton et al., 2016). 
Second, to test whether the influence of the trade credit channel on firm investment 
significantly differs according to the bank-borrower distance, we interact NTC with borrower-to-
branch distance. Model specification is shown by Equation (3). The estimation results of our model 
are reported in column (3) of Table 4. As expected and in line with the evidence provided by 
Alessandrini et al. (2009) on Italian firms, the sign and the statistical significance of the 
coefficient  on the interaction term NTC*borrower-to-branch distance is not statistically significant 
meaning that smaller borrower-to-branch distance does not always enhance credit availability. 
This result is motivated by the nature of our sample of cooperative banks operating with SMEs 
mostly on a local basis. Nevertheless, the main effect on NTC remains in line with our previous 
results as its coefficient is still negative and statistically significant at the 1% level.  
 
[Insert table 4 about here] 
    
7. Robustness tests       
To confirm our empirical results on the relationship between the trade credit channel and firm 
investment behavior, we perform several robustness checks that leave our previous findings 
unchanged. 
 
7.1 Addressing potential endogeneity concerns      
In this section we address the endogeneity associated with potential reverse causality issues and 
omitted variable bias resulting from the simultaneous specification of the trade credit variable 
and investment. Therefore, to assuage concerns about potential endogeneity issues that might 
affect our estimation results, we perform instrumental variable (IV) estimation with respect to 
our baseline model of Equation (1) by using banking-related instruments.  
We use as instrumental variables the equity ratio (Equity Ratio), the non-performing loan 
ratio (NPL ratio), the return on average assets (ROAA) and the bank size expressed as the 
logarithm of total assets (Bank Size), following Storz et al. (2017), Ferrando and Wolski (2018) 
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and Norden et al. (2020). In this regard, we follow the argument that the situation of a financing 
bank should be unrelated to company’s investment decisions, but may affect the degree of trade 
credit in the corporate sector (Ferrando and Wolski, 2018)16, assuming that banks are not active 
firms’ investors playing a determinant role in its operating and financing decisions. Therefore, 
these instruments could be referred to as pure numbers that are likely to affect the firm net trade 
credit position without directly affecting our dependent variable represented by the annual 
percentage change in the firm’s capital expenditure. The validity and importance of the 
instruments for the control variables are verified using a number of diagnostic tests reported at 
the bottom of Table 5, which reports the second stage of the regressions and the value of the 
coefficients and standard errors of the two instrumental variables in the first stage. Results are 
reported in Table 5. Our variable of interest is the firm net trade credit position ,𝑛, . 
Consistent with our previous results in Table 2, instrumental variable estimation confirms that an 
increase in net trade credit negatively affects firm investment behavior. This effect is statistically 
significant at the 1% level in model specification shown in Table 5. Overall, the results estimated 
by performing an IV estimation are in line with our baseline model’s main findings and the 
diagnostic tests do not specify any problems regarding the application of instruments used, thus 
providing a reliable robustness check to our main results. 
 
[Insert table 5 about here] 
 
7.2 Influence of crisis periods      
As an additional robustness check, we now run our baseline regression model in Equation (1) on 
the entire sample period by removing from the analysis those years characterized by acute 
financial instability, i.e., 2008, 2009 and 2011, to investigate whether our previous results might 
be influenced by in-crisis periods. Indeed, the 2007 financial crisis and the 2011 European 
Sovereign Debt Crisis have hampered access to bank credit (Kayshap and Stein, 2000; Puri et al., 
2011; Jiménez et al., 2012; Jiménez et al., 2014) with a disproportionately greater effect for 
private, more informationally opaque firms (De Young et al., 2015). The results are shown in the 
first column of Table 6. The effect of the trade credit channel on firm investment remains 
qualitatively unchanged, i.e., negative and statistically significant at the 5% and 10% level, as 
shown in columns (1) and (2) in Table 6. 
                                                             
16
 A likely scenario is the one in which weak banks may be unable to provide sufficient credit to the corporate sector 
to finance firm investment projects. In such a scenario, the variation in the firm investment levels explained by the 
corresponding bank specific situation materializes through the corporate funding structure, which is related to the 




[Insert table 6 about here] 
 
7.3 Accounting for firm heterogeneity      
We now verify whether our results might differ across firms of different collateralization levels 
since collateral plays an important role in the firm capability of raising external funding. In this 
regard, empirical evidence shows that higher-collateralized firms face a lower cost of debt and 
benefit from higher availability of external finance (Benmelech and Bergman, 2011). Thus, firms 
which are more collateralized are less likely to be financially constrained, thus affecting their 
reliance on the trade credit channel as a funding source. For this purpose, we created the binary 
variable high collateral that takes a value of 1 for those firms whose ratio of fixed tangible assets 
over total assets is above the median value of the distribution, and 0 otherwise. We split our data 
sample into two sub-samples of high- and low-collateralized SMEs and re-run our baseline 
model in Equation (1). The results are displayed in Table 7. Again, our previous results hold 
robust as they remain qualitatively unchanged, with a negative and statistically significant effect at 
the 5% and 1% level of the trade credit channel on firm investment for the two sub-samples of 
both high- and low-collateralized firms, reported in columns (2)-(3) and (4)-(5) in Table 7, 
respectively. However, as expected, firm reliance on the trade credit channel to boost 
investments is decreasing in the degree of firm collateralization due to increased access to bank 
credit, as documented by the positive and statistically coefficient associated with the interaction 
term NTC*high collateral reported in column (1) in Table 7. Indeed, Cerqueiro et al. (2016) show 
that collateral plays an important and positive role in the provision of lending, while Benmelech 
and Bergman (2011) find a negative relationship between collateral and the cost of external debt 
finance. 
[Insert table 7 about here] 
 
7.4 Longer trade credit period  
As a last robustness test, due to the short-term nature of trade credit contracts, we now test 
whether our results might be driven by those firms characterized by a trade credit period 
exceeding 365 days. To this purpose, we now re-run our baseline model in Equation (1) by 
removing from the analysis SMEs having a trade credit period exceeding one year with both days 
sales (DSO) and days payable (DPO) outstanding over 365 days. The results are displayed in 
Table 8. Even in this case, our previous results remain unaffected, with a negative and 




[Insert table 8 about here] 
 
7.5 Additional controls  
To control for possible influence from extra firm-specific shocks, we augment the main model 
specification by additional bank-specific variables which may influence firm investment decisions 
other than the trade credit channel.  
First, we re-perform our baseline model in Equation (1) by controlling for those bank-
specific characteristics used as instrumental variables in our IV estimation setting depicted in 
section 6.1, i.e., the equity ratio (Equity Ratio), the non-performing loan ratio (NPL ratio), the 
return on average assets (ROAA) and the bank size expressed as the logarithm of total assets 
(Bank Size). The results are displayed in Table 9. This inclusion leaves our main findings 
unaffected. 
[Insert table 9 about here] 
 
Second, we re-perform our baseline model in Equation (1) by controlling for the 
borrowing firm’s regional fixed effects to control for possible macroeconomic shocks at the 
regional or provincial level which may affect firm investment decisions. The results are displayed 
in Table 10. Our main findings remain, even in this case, qualitatively unchanged. 
 
[Insert table 10 about here] 
 
8. Conclusions 
Besides bank lending, evidence has shown that trade credit can be considered to be the next 
most important source of SME external financing (OECD, 2014). Within this context, this paper 
provides a novel contribution to the literature by investigating the extent to which SME reliance 
on the trade credit channel to finance investment decisions is affected by the structure of the 
local banking system and relationship banking features. Specifically, we address this research 
questions by focusing on a sample of 18,682 SMEs operating with 99 cooperative banks over the 
time period 2008-2014 and by exploiting the geographical heterogeneity of the Italian banking 
market characterized by several provinces populated by an abundance of cooperative banks’ 
branches mostly relying on soft information in their credit relationships.  
Firstly, we find a significant influence of the trade credit channel on firm investment 
decisions, suggesting that trade credit significantly affects the growth rate of firm investment. 
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Secondly, we document that those SMEs located in Italian geographical provinces 
characterized by an abundance of cooperative banks’ branches relying on soft information-
intensive relationship banking are less dependent on trade credit to finance their investment 
decisions. This is supportive of the view that local relationship cooperative banks still have 
competitive advantages over nationwide banks in small business lending, since the latter are 
characterized by organizational complexity and face more severe communication frictions due to 
the greater distance between their headquarters and local branches. This result is of particular 
relevance in light of the technological progress and deregulation in the banking sector that 
pushes towards eroding the comparative advantage of local relationship banks in serving small 
businesses.  
Lastly, we provide evidence that shorter firm-bank relationships lead to a greater 
dependence of companies on the trade credit channel to boost investments, while the influence 
of firm-bank geographical proximity on this nexus is not significant due to the local nature of 
SMEs-cooperative banks credit relationships nurtured predominantly on a local basis. 
To conclude, our results suggest that the trade credit channel plays a significant influence 
on firm investment decisions and that the magnitude of this influence depends on the structure 
of the local banking market and on the intensity of relationship banking. Since investments play a 
crucial role to boost SMEs’ economic recovery, the results of this paper contribute to the current 
academic and policy debates on safeguarding and preserving business continuity in the midst of 
the current Covid-19 crisis, which is likely to drive many businesses into bankruptcies. Given the 
profound implications of this Covid-19-induced pandemic, fostering a deep understanding of the 
real effects of firm financing sources is paramount to avoid bankruptcy as it can not only 
support financially distressed companies to benefit from policy measures aimed at preserving 
firms relationships along the supply chain, but also it can make firms more confident to invest 
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Figures and tables 
 
Figure 1. Predicted outcomes of ∆CAPEX at percentiles of NTC  
 





















Table 1. Variables’ descriptions and descriptive statistics 
 
Variable Description Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
       
Dependent Variable 
       
ΔCAPEX year-on-year change in 
capital expenditure  
52,913 0.101473 0.427132 -0.4 1.5 
       
Firm-level Variables 
       
NTC net trade credit 79,655 0.123351 0.238352 -0.3355856 0.5961828 
CR firm current ratio  80,715 120.4969 97.69209 6.4 400 
ULC firm unit labor cost  71,071 21.17461 16.24462 2.04 62.33 
Bank Debt/Total 
Liabilities 
short and long term bank 
debt over total liabilities 
76,262 40.05312 24.64493 3.88 92.24 




ratio of the firm's financial 
fixed assets to total assets 




ratio of the firm's 
intangible assets to total 
assets 




ratio of the bank's firm 
tangible assets to total 
assets 
76,856 25.34375 23.92339 0.71 80.71 
Inventory/Total 
Assets 
ratio of the firm's 
inventory to total assets 
66,260 26.77742 26.16904 0.49 90.23 
Total Assets firm total assets  87,527 5157.792 8127.442 68,000 31,449,000 
ROA firm's return on assets 84,027 1.865897 7.70142 -14.14 22.41 
DPO Firm's days payable 
outstanding  
79,999 177.6105 179.2663 24.54629 771.1868 
DSO Firm's days sales 
outstanding  
80,516 179.8311 156.6654 17.69697 673.3621 
 
Relationship Banking Variables 
Length of 
Relationship 
number of years of the 
bank-firm relationship 
[logarithm of 1 + length 















binary variable = 1 if the 
borrower and the bank are 
located in the same 
geographical location, and 
0 otherwise 
52,569 0.648329 0.477497 0 1 
       
Bank-level Variables 
       
Bank ROAA bank's return on average 
assets 
82,196 0.211137 0.658931 -2.854 1.475 




ratio of the bank's 
impaired loans over gross 
loans 
79,676 9.089273 5.855901 1.434 40.668 
Bank Total Assets Log of the bank's total 
assets 
82,196 14.00308 0.723207 11.05406 16.02128 
Cooperative banking Binary variable equal to 1 
if the density of 
cooperative banks’ 
branches measured by the 
number of cooperative 
branches located in a 
province over the number 
of firms operating in that 
province is above the 
median value of the 
distribution, and 0 
otherwise 























Table 2. Baseline Model of Trade Credit 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 












       
NTC -0.525*** -0.546*** -0.517*** -0.298*** -0.370*** -0.365*** 
 (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.053) (0.072) (0.071) 
CR     -0.000 -0.000 
     (0.000) (0.000) 
ULC     -0.005*** -0.005*** 
     (0.001) (0.001) 
Bank Debt/Total 
Liabilities 
    -0.000 -0.000 
     (0.001) (0.001) 
Inventory Period     0.000 0.000 
     (0.000) (0.000) 
Financial Fixed/Total 
Assets 
   1.276*** 1.215*** 1.208*** 
    (0.150) (0.168) (0.156) 
Intangible 
Assets/Total Assets 
   0.021*** 0.020*** 0.022*** 
    (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Tangible Assets/Total 
Assets 
   0.014*** 0.013*** 0.014*** 
    (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Inventory/Total Assets     -0.004*** -0.004*** 
     (0.001) (0.001) 
ROA     0.005*** 0.005*** 
     (0.001) (0.001) 
       
Observations 16,240 16,240 16,240 16,240 16,240 16,240 
R-squared 0.04 0.02 0.09 0.15 0.10 0.16 
Number of firm-
bank pairs 
6,480 6,480 6,480 6,480 6,480 6,480 
Yearly FE YES NO NO NO YES NO 
Industry FE NO YES NO NO YES NO 
Year x Industry FE NO NO YES YES NO YES 
Note: The table presents the results of the FE panel regression analysis for the baselines model where the dependent variable is ∆ 𝑋 ,𝑛,  which is the annual percentage change in the firm’s capital expenditure. ,𝑛,  represents the trade credit channel 
measured as the difference between the firm’s account receivables and account payables scaled by the firm’s size as measured by 
total assets. All variables are defined in Table 1. Columns (1) to (3) are a reduced form of the full model of Equation (1). Year, 
Industry and Year*Industry fixed effects are incorporated in regressions where indicated (not reported). Robust errors are 












Table 3. Trade Credit & Cooperative Banking 
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES FE Panel Model FE Panel Model 
   
NTC -0.479*** -0.477*** 
 (0.087) (0.085) 
NTC *cooperative banking 0.192** 0.197** 
 (0.082) (0.080) 
Cooperative banking -0.005 -0.006 
 (0.026) (0.026) 
CR -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
ULC -0.005*** -0.005*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Bank Debt/Total Liabilities -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Inventory Period 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Financial Fixed/Total Assets 1.220*** 1.213*** 
 (0.168) (0.156) 
Intangible Assets/Total Assets 0.020*** 0.022*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Tangible Assets/Total Assets 0.013*** 0.014*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Inventory/Total Assets -0.004*** -0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
ROA 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
   
Observations 16,136 16,136 
R-squared 0.11 0.16 
Number of firm-bank pairs 6,439 6,439 
Yearly FE YES NO 
Industry FE YES NO 
Year x Industry FE NO YES 
Note: The table presents the results of the FE panel regression analysis for Trade Credit & Local Banking System model where 
the dependent variable is ∆ 𝑋 ,𝑛,  which is the annual percentage change in the firm’s capital expenditure. ,𝑛,  
represents the trade credit channel measured as the difference between the firm’s account receivables and account payables scaled 
by the firm’s size as measured by total assets. All variables are defined in Table 1. Year, Industry and Year*Industry fixed effects 
are incorporated in regressions where indicated (not reported). Robust errors are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
















Table 4. Trade Credit & Relationship Banking 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 








     
NTC -0.462*** -0.441*** -0.455*** -0.448*** 
 (0.091) (0.091) (0.102) (0.099) 
NTC * length of relationship 0.012** 0.010**   
 (0.006) (0.006)   
Length of relationship -0.121*** 0.014*   
 (0.025) (0.007)   
NTC * borrower-to-branch distance   0.123 0.122 
   (0.110) (0.109) 
Borrower-to-branch distance   -0.255 -0.325 
   (0.211) (0.312) 
CR -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ULC -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Bank Debt/Total Liabilities -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Inventory Period 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Financial Fixed/Total Assets 1.214*** 1.197*** 1.212*** 1.206*** 
 (0.168) (0.156) (0.172) (0.161) 
Intangible Assets/Total Assets 0.020*** 0.022*** 0.020*** 0.022*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Tangible Assets/Total Assets 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Inventory/Total Assets -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
ROA 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
     
Observations 16,079 16,079 15,492 15,492 
R-squared 0.10 0.16 0.11 0.16 
Number of firm-bank pairs 6,429 6,429 6,154 6,154 
Yearly FE YES NO YES NO 
Industry FE YES NO YES NO 
Year x Industry FE NO YES NO YES 
Note: The table presents the results of the FE panel regression analysis for Trade Credit & Banking Relationships model where 
the dependent variable is ∆ 𝑋 ,𝑛,  which is the annual percentage change in the firm’s capital expenditure. ,𝑛,  
represents the trade credit channel measured as the difference between the firm’s account receivables and account payables scaled 
by the firm’s size as measured by total assets. All variables are defined in Table 1. Year, Industry and Year*Industry fixed effects 
are incorporated in regressions where indicated (not reported). Robust errors are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 




















Bank Debt/Total Liabilities 0.018*** 
 (0.002) 
Inventory Period -0.000 
 (0.000) 
Financial Fixed/Total Assets -1.243*** 
 (0.422) 
Intangible Assets/Total Assets -0.008 
 (0.005) 
Tangible Assets/Total Assets -0.014*** 
 (0.004) 






Number of firm-bank pairs 5,116 
  
Tests  
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 36.169 




Hansen J 0.1570 
  
First Stage  
Equity Ratio 0.005*** 
 (0.001) 
NPL Ratio 0.002*** 
 (0.001) 𝑅  -0.001 
 (0.001) 
Bank Size 0.055*** 
 (0.009) 
Note: The table reports in column (1) and (2) coefficient estimates and robust standard errors (in parentheses) for the two-stage treatment effects 
model of Equation (1). In column (1) we assume that all control variables used in the model are endogenous and we use their own lagged values 
as instruments, while in column (2) we treat NTC as endogenous and we use banking-related instruments. The sample period is 2008–2014. The 
first stage includes all explanatory variables in the second stage. The dependent variable is ∆ 𝑋 ,𝑛,  which is the annual percentage change in 
the firm’s capital expenditure. ,𝑛,  represents the trade credit channel measured as the difference between the firm’s account receivables and 
account payables scaled by the firm’s size as measured by total assets. The Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic and the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F 
statistic represent weak identification tests. The Kleibergen-Paap is a test of under-identification distributed as chi-square under the null of under-
identification. The Anderson Rubin and Stock-Wright LM S statistic are weak-instrument-robust inference tests, distributed as F-test and chi-
square respectively, under the null that coefficients of the endogenous regressors in the structural equation are jointly equal to zero, and the over-
identifying restrictions are valid. The Hansen J statistic is a test of the over-identifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of 
instrument validity. The first-stage Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic is a test for weak instrument. All variables are defined in Table 1. In the 
margin, we report coefficients and standard errors for the instrumental variables. Robust errors are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1, respectively. 
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Table 6. Trade Credit in Off-Crisis Periods 
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES FE Panel Model FE Panel Model 
   
NTC -0.282*** -0.230** 
 (0.104) (0.102) 
CR -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
ULC -0.007*** -0.007*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Bank Debt/Total Liabilities -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Inventory Period 0.000** 0.000** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Financial Fixed/Total Assets 0.957*** 0.960*** 
 (0.232) (0.212) 
Intangible Assets/Total Assets 0.022*** 0.023*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
Tangible Assets/Total Assets 0.012*** 0.012*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Inventory/Total Assets -0.004** -0.004*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
ROA 0.002 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
   
Observations 10,728 10,728 
Number of firm-bank pairs 0.09 0.14 
R-squared 5,798 5,798 
Yearly FE YES NO 
Industry FE YES NO 
Year x Industry FE NO YES 
Note: The table presents the results of the FE panel regression analysis for Trade Credit in Off-Crisis Periods model where the 
dependent variable is ∆ 𝑋 ,𝑛,  which is the annual percentage change in the firm’s capital expenditure. ,𝑛,  represents 
the trade credit channel measured as the difference between the firm’s account receivables and account payables scaled by the  
firm’s size as measured by total assets. All variables are defined in Table 1. Year, Industry and Year*Industry fixed effects are 














Table 7. Baseline Model: Low vs High Collateralised Firms 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES All Firms Low-Collateralized Firms High-Collateralized Firms 
      
NTC -0.404*** -0.315*** -0.227** -0.475*** -0.468*** 
 (0.078) (0.105) (0.103) (0.109) (0.109) 
NTC * High Collateral 0.131**     
 (0.075)     
High Collateral 0.048**     
 (0.024)     
CR -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ULC -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.004** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Bank Debt/Total Liabilities -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Inventory Period 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Financial Fixed/Total Assets 1.217*** 1.401*** 1.535*** 0.641*** 0.582*** 
 (0.157) (0.269) (0.262) (0.240) (0.221) 
Intangible Assets/Total Assets 0.021*** 0.032*** 0.035*** 0.004 0.003 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Tangible Assets/Total Assets 0.012*** 0.036*** 0.039*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Inventory/Total Assets -0.004*** -0.002 -0.002 -0.007*** -0.008*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
ROA 0.005*** 0.002 0.001 0.005** 0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
      
Observations 16,240 7,806 7,806 8,434 8,434 
R-squared 0.16 0.11 0.18 0.13 0.21 
Number of firm-bank pairs 6,480 3,490 3,490 3,548 3,548 
Yearly FE NO YES NO YES NO 
Industry FE NO YES NO YES NO 
Year x Industry FE YES NO YES NO YES 
Note: The table presents the results of the FE panel regression analysis for the Baseline Model: Low vs High Collateralized Firms 
where the dependent variable is ∆ 𝑋 ,𝑛,  which is the annual percentage change in the firm’s capital expenditure. ,𝑛,  
represents the trade credit channel measured as the difference between the firm’s account receivables and account payables scaled 
by the firm’s size as measured by total assets. All variables are defined in Table 1. Year, Industry and Year*Industry fixed effects 
are incorporated in regressions where indicated (not reported). Robust errors are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 












Table 8. Trade Credit & Trade Credit Period  
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES FE Panel Model FE Panel Model 
   
NTC -0.361*** -0.369*** 
 (0.075) (0.075) 
CR -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
ULC -0.006*** -0.006*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) 
Bank Debt/Total Liabilities -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Inventory Period 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Financial Fixed/Total Assets 1.272*** 1.245*** 
 (0.181) (0.166) 
Intangible Assets/Total Assets 0.020*** 0.022*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) 
Tangible Assets/Total Assets 0.013*** 0.014*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Inventory/Total Assets -0.004*** -0.005*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
ROA 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
   
Observations 15,143 15,143 
Number of firm-bank pairs 0.10 0.15 
R-squared 6,117 6,117 
Yearly FE YES NO 
Industry FE YES NO 
Year x Industry FE NO YES 
Note: The table presents the results of the FE panel regression analysis for the Trade Credit & Trade Credit Period model where 
the dependent variable is ∆ 𝑋 ,𝑛,  which is the annual percentage change in the firm’s capital expenditure. ,𝑛,  
represents the trade credit channel measured as the difference between the firm’s account receivables and account payables scaled 
by the firm’s size as measured by total assets. All variables are defined in Table 1. Year, Industry and Year*Industry fixed effects 
are incorporated in regressions where indicated (not reported). Robust errors are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 














Table 9. Baseline Model of Trade Credit with Bank-Specific Controls 
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES FE Panel Model FE Panel Model 
   
NTC -0.301*** -0.300*** 
 (0.076) (0.074) 
CR -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
ULC -0.005*** -0.006*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Bank Debt/Total Liabilities -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Inventory Period 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Financial Fixed/Total Assets 1.362*** 1.333*** 
 (0.179) (0.167) 
Intangible Assets/Total Assets 0.022*** 0.023*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
Tangible Assets/Total Assets 0.014*** 0.014*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Inventory/Total Assets -0.003** -0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
ROA 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
ROAA 0.004 0.004 
 (0.008) (0.008) 
Equity Ratio 0.003 0.002 
 (0.009) (0.009) 
NPL Ratio 0.002 0.003 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
Bank Size 0.049 0.065 
 (0.089) (0.093) 
   
Observations 14,595 14,595 
Number of firm-bank pairs 0.11 0.16 
R-squared 5,986 5,986 
Yearly FE YES NO 
Industry FE YES NO 
Year x Industry FE NO YES 
Note: The table presents the results of the FE panel regression analysis for the Baseline Model with Bank-Specific Controls where 
the dependent variable is ∆ 𝑋 ,𝑛,  which is the annual percentage change in the firm’s capital expenditure. ,𝑛,  
represents the trade credit channel measured as the difference between the firm’s account receivables and account payables scaled 
by the firm’s size as measured by total assets. All variables are defined in Table 1. Year, Industry and Year*Industry fixed effects 
are incorporated in regressions where indicated (not reported). Robust errors are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 









Table 10. Baseline Model of Trade Credit with Borrower’s Regional Fixed Effects 
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES FE Panel Model FE Panel Model 
   
NTC -0.366*** -0.361*** 
 (0.073) (0.072) 
CR -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
ULC -0.005*** -0.005*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Bank Debt/Total Liabilities -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Inventory Period 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Financial Fixed/Total Assets 1.210*** 1.204*** 
 (0.168) (0.157) 
Intangible Assets/Total Assets 0.020*** 0.022*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Tangible Assets/Total Assets 0.013*** 0.014*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Inventory/Total Assets -0.003*** -0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
ROA 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
   
Observations 16,136 16,136 
Number of firm-bank pairs 0.10 0.16 
R-squared 6,439 6,439 
Yearly FE YES NO 
Industry FE YES NO 
Year x Industry FE NO YES 
Regional FE YES YES 
Note: The table presents the results of the RE panel regression analysis for the Baseline Model with Borrower’s Regional and 
Provincial Fixed Effects where the dependent variable is ∆ 𝑋 ,𝑛,  which is the annual percentage change in the firm’s capital 
expenditure. ,𝑛,  represents the trade credit channel measured as the difference between the firm’s account receivables and 
account payables scaled by the firm’s size as measured by total assets. All variables are defined in Table 1. Year, Industry and 
Year*Industry fixed effects are incorporated in regressions where indicated (not reported). Robust errors are reported in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, respectively. 
 
